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Abstract. The requirement of bottom-up action from all the countries to deal with climate 
change makes it necessary to analyze the factors influencing policy adoption. This article 
contributes to the policy literature by shedding light on the conditions, which incentivize 
countries to adopt more climate mitigation policies. The theoretical argument builds on the 
integrated approaches to study policy diffusion, which include both internal and external 
determinants as explanations for the adoption of policies. While previous applications typically 
operationalize the latter by regional proximity, this study highlights the added value of 
network dependencies capturing political and cooperative interactions across countries. The 
article finds that the adoption of climate policies is a matter of social influence. Countries are 
more likely to adopt policies if they cooperate with countries that have adopted more climate 
policies and are in a similar structural position to countries that are active in climate 
protection. This article is not only an important theoretical contribution to the policy literature 
but also enriches our methodological and empirical understanding of climate policy diffusion. 
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Introduction 
The importance of domestic policy adoption to alleviate the adverse effects of climate 
change is a cornerstone of international negotiations. The Paris Agreement of 2015 is the first 
international treaty in the history of climate change politics where more than 180 countries 
in the world agreed to act cohesively. Unlike its predecessors, the treaty is based on the 
principle of self-determination, requiring ambitious national climate protection policies. It 
hinges completely on voluntary pledges without any provisions for legally binding emission 
targets. The current pledges made by the countries are  barely sufficient to contain 
temperature rise by 2 degrees Celsius (Du Robiou Pont et al. 2017). Additionally, while the 
agreement spells out an ambitious target to limit temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius, 
there are no concrete plans to accomplish this (Spash 2016). It also ignores equity and justice 
considerations crucial in multilateral processes (Clémençon 2016). Without any top-down 
commitments in the Paris Agreement, countries taking up ambitious domestic policy 
interventions to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will determine its success. This 
brings us to the pertinent question of what exactly motivates a country to adopt climate 
change mitigation policies. 
Countries have little incentive to engage in mitigation since global climate change is a 
classic ‘tragedy of the commons‘ (Hardin 1968). Investing resources to adopt mitigation 
policies targeting the reduction of GHG emissions entails providing a global public good with 
non-excludable benefits. These benefits not only accrue to the country investing in mitigation 
but also to others. This encourages free-riding behavior, i.e. enjoying the paybacks from other 
countries’ climate protection efforts, while avoiding costly policies themselves. The free-riding 
incentives decrease the probability of implementing mitigation policies. Notwithstanding the 
free-riding incentives from others’ mitigation action, countries have adopted several national 
mitigation policies. The GLOBE Climate Legislation Study (2016; 2014) finds that between 2009 
and 2014, the number of climate policies adopted almost doubled in the 99 countries they 
studied. Framing climate change mitigation as a collective action issue and the reason why 
countries do not adopt mitigation policies offers only a partial explanation for mitigation policy 
adoption. It is evident that some countries strongly support mitigation commitments while 
others are more reluctant (Dimitrov 2010). The current literature counteracts the collective 
action explanation using co-benefits of mitigation policies as an alternative (Dolšak 2009). 
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Co-benefits are defined as benefits like the reduction of air pollution, energy security, etc., 
ensuing locally from the adoption of a climate change mitigation policy 1  (IPCC 2007). 
Nonetheless, the generation of co-benefits2 does not detract from the fact that the primary 
motivation of adopting mitigation policies is to reduce GHG emissions globally. Scholars argue 
that while co-benefits of mitigation can be crucial for policymakers, it is in fact often 
overlooked in policy design (IPCC, 2007; Jochem & Madlener, 2003; Nemet, Holloway, & 
Meier, 2010). Consequently, we expect that co-benefits from a mitigation policy are 
insufficient to spur countries to take up large-scale emission reductions. For example, 
countries like the United States and China are frequently in a deadlock where each waits for 
the other to take action (Thurston 2013). If co-benefits were so attractive, they would not 
observe each other’s behavior before taking domestic mitigation action. Hence, we are 
interested in understanding how international relations and the anticipation of how other 
countries behave, foster or hinder the adoption of climate change mitigation policies. 
We offer our perspective on what motivates the adoption of climate policy. In an 
increasingly interconnected world, countries can easily observe the behavior of other 
countries. Keeping this in mind, we specifically investigate two main mechanisms: (1) diffusion 
triggered through interaction and (2) diffusion triggered through interaction similarity. In the 
context of the first mechanism, we expect that countries more likely innovate policies when 
they are directly interacting with other countries that have already adopted the respective 
policies. Since climate change is a global issue, it requires interactions to coordinate and 
harmonize national policies. To this end, country officials meet, communicate, cooperate, 
mutually learn, and exchange ideas in various negotiation forums, as well as international 
organizations. This may stimulate policy adoption back home, since country officials can 
emulate or learn from the other countries with whom they interacted. Interaction similarity is 
our second causal mechanism. We expect two countries that are structurally similar in their 
interactions to other counties to behave in a similar way, because these countries have similar 
diplomatic relations, meet with the same countries, and exchange information with same 
countries. On the one hand, these countries face the same kinds of incentives and on the other 
hand these countries compare themselves with each other. Both of these may lead to the 
adoption of similar policies.  
                                                 
1 Mitigation policies usually relate to energy demand, supply, transportation, energy efficiency 
measures, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries 
(REDD+), etc. 
2 See IPCC 2007, Chapter 11 for a more detailed discussion on this issue 
(https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch11.html) 
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Although the policy diffusion literature has emphasized the importance of interactions 
(Braun, Gilardi 2006; Simmons, Elkins 2004), no research studies on climate policy adoption 
incorporated political interactions as an explanation for mitigation policy adoption. We 
address this gap by investigating how cooperative behavior by interconnected countries 
influences the diffusion of climate policies. 
The following two sections of the article present an overview of the developments in the 
policy diffusion literature and explore the factors influencing climate policy. We explain why 
the extant literature has not satisfactorily incorporated the issue of country interactions and 
highlight the advantages of a dynamic network to explore policy diffusion. These sections are 
succeeded by our analytical approach and research design. Methodologically, our analysis 
relies on a temporal network autocorrelation model (Leenders, 2002; Leifeld & Cranmer, 
2016). It allows us to disentangle the various factors influencing mitigation policy adoption. 
These range from internal motives, resources, or constraints of a country and its international 
relations, over time. By studying cooperative political interactions in the context of the global 
climate change issue, we demonstrate that the adoption of mitigation policies is a matter of 
social influence. Our results show that countries are more likely to adopt policies if they 
interact with other countries that have already adopted climate policies. Countries also tend 
to behave akin to those in a similar structural position. The results reflect the necessity of 
integrating country interactions in the study of climate policy adoption and highlight that they 
are a much more precise proxy of international interactions as they fluctuate over time.  
Theoretical Approaches to Policy Diffusion 
The age of globalization and international cooperation has many implications for 
policymaking. One such implication is that of cross-national policy convergence. It happens 
when policy choices in one countries can influence the policy choices of other countries 
(Bennett 1991; Plümper, Schneider 2009). Many scholars empirically analyze this 
phenomenon (Braun, Gilardi 2006; Meseguer, Gilardi 2009; Gilardi 2005). They evaluate the 
interconnectedness between international relations and domestic policy innovation in the 
context of transnational diffusion processes or clustered decision-making. In other words, we 
can understand diffusion as a ‘dispersion or dissemination’ (Elkins, Simmons 2005, p. 36) of 
political practice. Scholars study these processes in a wide range of phenomena like specific 
policy instruments, institutions, or policy frameworks (cp. Gilardi 2012 for an overview). 
Rogers (1983, p. 6) defines policy diffusion as a ‘process by which [policy] innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system’. The 
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patterns of policy diffusion are often expressed in two levels: the unit of analysis (e.g. 
countries) and the social structure (e.g. a policy domain) (True, Mintrom 2001). The 
mechanisms of policy innovation are either due to the internal characteristics of the unit of 
analysis (e.g. socio-economic conditions) or the ‘unit’s interaction with others in the broader 
social system’ (True, Mintrom 2001, p. 34).  
Research explains policy adoption by internal and external factors or both (Berry, Berry 
2007). Internal approaches posit that social, political, and economic factors endemic to a 
country influence policy adoption rather than the actions of other countries (Canon, Baum 
1981; Gray 1973). Over time, scholars challenged the perspective that others’ behavior does 
not affect policy adoption decisions. This led to the emergence of the study of possible 
external determinants influencing policy adoption. These approaches claim that policy 
diffusion occurs when the choices made by one government influences another government’s 
decision to adopt a policy innovation (Graham et al. 2013). The external factor considered has 
been mainly geographic proximity. According to Berry and Berry (1990), if we do not account 
for similarities between neighboring countries, an omitted variable bias can lead to false 
evidence of policy diffusion. Drawing from the policy transfer literature, diffusion studies 
emphasize the mechanisms of social influence, which manifest through coercion, competition, 
learning, or emulation (Gilardi 2012; Berry, Berry 2007). The common idea behind all these 
causal mechanisms of policy diffusion is that the adoption of policies in one country affects 
the behavior of interdependent countries (Braun, Gilardi 2006).  
Geographical interdependencies have typically been the mainstay of diffusion studies. 
Although they are theoretically important, focusing exclusively on them can significantly 
undermine our understanding of diffusion processes. There is very little reason to believe that 
in an increasingly interconnected world, policy diffusion can happen only among neighbors. 
Karch (2007, p. 72) states we need to ‘move beyond the focus on the impact of geographic 
proximity’ to explain diffusion. Consequently, some scholars incorporate other factors like 
external political pressures (Simon and Elkins 2004), common memberships in international 
institutions (Holzinger, Knill 2005; Volden et al. 2008) and so on. Volden et al. (2008) argue 
that geographically close states also share common political, economic, and demographic 
characteristics, which may explain policy diffusion. While it is not unlikely that states learn 
from their neighbors, they may also learn from policy experiences in other regions of the world 
(Matissoff and Edwards, 2014). Policy learning and diffusion can also happen when states are 
imitating ‘cultural cohorts, rather than geographical cohorts’ (Matisoff, Edwards 2014, p. 798). 
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Additionally, they can occur due to structural interdependencies. Structurally interdependent 
countries are those, which have a relation or connection permitting communication or 
interaction (Mohrenberg, 2017). The discussions reveal that it is important to take into 
consideration ties between countries that are not necessarily geographically close. 
To understand such structural interdependencies, scholars often integrate a network 
perspective in their analysis of policy diffusion. This allows the incorporation of numerous 
connections and dependencies among individual or collective actors, political units, or 
different organizations (see, for example, Marin, Wellman 2011). A network perspective in 
studying the diffusion of policies allows us to explicitly integrate interdependencies arising 
from social interactions of actors in a policy domain. Consequently, scholars across different 
policy areas have been assimilating a more refined analytical approach to understand these 
interdependencies, where the behavior of one actor can be dependent on the actions of other 
actors (Dorussen, Ward 2010). For examples in different policy domains using network 
analysis to explain policy diffusion, see Chyzh (2016), who studied human rights diffusion via 
trade networks; Haim (2016), who investigated how a network of international political 
alliances influence trade flows; and Mohrenberg (2017), who studied the diffusion of foreign 
trade policies through bilateral trade flows. Our article contributes to and builds on this 
literature using network analysis to explain policy diffusion in the context of climate policy on 
the country level. 
Determinants of Climate and Environmental Policy Diffusion 
Similar to studies in other policy areas, research on climate or environmental policy 
explains policy adoption either by policy diffusion between geographically neighboring 
countries (Matisoff 2008) or due to the influence of international organizations (Oberthür, 
Tänzer 2002), and/or by internal determinants (Regens 1980). In addition, some studies use 
integrated approaches of both external and internal determinants to climate or environmental 
policy diffusion. For example, Dolšak (2009, 2013) examines how internal factors (domestic 
air pollution, the level of income, democracy levels) with external factors (a country’s 
embeddedness in different networks of intergovernmental organizations (IGO)) affect policy 
diffusion. Her findings show that countries have a particular incentive to implement 
international climate protection agreements when emission reduction policies generate 
domestic co-benefits like reduced domestic pollution. Among external factors, Dolšak (2013) 
finds that the pressures of EU accession and levels of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 
neighboring countries influence climate policy adoption. Biesenbender and Tosun (2014) 
6 
point out that both external (learning from other international organizations) and internal 
determinants (political preferences) are responsible for environmental policy diffusion. 
Important internal determinants are the income of a country, political partisanship, 
institutional factors, and vulnerability to climate change. With respect to income, Jänicke 
(2005) claims that more environmental friendly countries are also rich. Conversely, Madden 
(2014) finds that the relationship between GDP per capita and climate policy adoption is 
negative, while Bättig and Bernauer (2009) do not find any relationship. Tobin (2017) 
examines climate policy adoption in developed countries and concludes that climate policy 
adoption behavior is positively correlated with high income. Also, natural resource rents are a 
sizeable part of the GDP and can influence the policy behavior of a country. Since climate 
protection requires that countries reduce their carbon emissions, it should imply a reduction 
in the use of fossil fuels. Studies, however, find that resource owners do not support mitigation 
policies that may reduce their incomes derived from the resource use (Eisenack et al. 2012). 
GHG emissions can be also an important internal determinant of climate policy adoption. 
Nachmany et al. (2014) state that almost all countries with significantly higher emissions have 
taken up mitigation policies to reduce GHG emissions. Scholars have also analyzed the 
relationship between climate change vulnerability and policy adoption, although more so in 
the context of adaptation3 policies rather than mitigation (Massey et al. 2014; Mozumder et 
al. 2011; Tol et al. 2008). Vulnerable countries have possibly contributed less to climate 
change and are economically less capable of adopting costly mitigation policies. Dolsâk (2001) 
states that vulnerability indeed does not have a significant impact on domestic mitigation 
efforts. Tubi et al. (2012) later reaffirms Dolsâk’s (2001) findings. Among internal political 
factors, partisanship is salient in explaining policy adoption. Left-wing parties are more 
encouraging of environmental issues and policy adoption (Neumayer 2003; Tobin 2017). More 
recently, the has been an upsurge in party polarization on climate change issues, with 
Republican politicians increasingly considering climate change to be fake (Dunlap et al. 2016). 
Other internal institutional factors like democracy are also essential for environmental (Bättig, 
Bernauer 2009; Neumayer 2002) and climate mitigation policy adoption (Dolšak (2013).  
International or external factors are important in the climate and environmental policy 
diffusion literature. According to Oberthür and Tänzer (2002, p. 325) examining the process 
of climate policy diffusion without incorporating the role of international institutions is 
incomplete and will seem to represent a result of internal factors or ‘simple horizontal policy 
                                                 
3 Adaptation is a process by which individuals, communities and countries attempt to deal with the 
consequences of climate change, usually on a local level (Hasson et al. 2010). 
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diffusion’ alone. Environmental policy is often associated with institutional interlinkages (Knill, 
Liefferink 2007; Jordan et al. 2005; Knill et al. 2014; Wurzel, Connelly 2011). For instance, EU 
membership significantly influences climate policy (Jänicke 2005) as well as strong domestic 
environmental policymaking (Liefferink et al. 2009). 
Overall, the literature emphasizes the primary role of internal determinants, and more 
recently international or external factors, but largely ignore political interactions in their 
analytical frameworks. Our main argument is that analyzing the process of climate policy 
diffusion will be incomplete if we do not account for political interactions to coordinate and/or 
harmonize national climate policies over time and between different pairs of countries. We 
follow Mohrenberg’s (2017) argument that diffusion depends on structural interdependencies 
due to interaction and communication even in the absence of geographic connection or 
proximity. Frequent interaction generates patterns of common behavior and/or structures of 
trust as well as habit, thereby establishing a network of political interactions. Accordingly, a 
network perspective allows us to integrate the role of interactions in the study of climate 
policy diffusion. It is imperative to utilize a network perspective, because as an issue area 
climate policy itself is an interdependent process. Actions by one country may very well have 
effects on other countries. The principal aim of our research is to assess the extent to which 
policy adoption is a function of these political interactions between countries, and extend the 
traditional approaches by including country interactions in the realm of international climate 
policy.  
A Networked Perspective on Climate Policy Diffusion 
We base our analytical framework on two integrated approaches to study policy diffusion. 
These approaches are the ‘unified model of government innovation’ by Berry and Berry (1990, 
2014, p. 325) and the conceptual framework laid out by Wejnert (2002).  
While the Berry and Berry model is convincing on account of its parsimonious and 
systematic combination of internal as well as external determinants, Wejnert’s (2002) 
framework offers a more detailed operationalization of important components influencing 
policy diffusion. In particular, Wejnert (2002) also includes social networks as an explanation 
for the diffusion of policies. She contends that the timing of policy adoptions depends on the 
‘interaction of social units in a process of communication’ (Wejnert 2002, p. 306) and maps 
out important network mechanisms that influence the behavior of social units. 
Our analytical approach combines these two integrated approaches by blending the 
parsimony of the Berry and Berry model with the richness of the Wejnert framework. In doing 
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so, we include dynamically evolving network dependencies as an important external 
determinant of policy diffusion along with regional proximity and the typical internal 
determinants as explanatory factors for the adoption of national policies. Hence, we consider 
the adoption of climate policies of country i (ADOPTit) as a function of internal determinants 
(INTit) and external determinants (EXTit). Internal determinants encompass the country-
specific motivation to tackle the climate change issue (Mit), the available resources and 
capacity of a country to implement climate policies (Rit), as well as already existing policies 
(ADOPTit-1) that relate to the problem of climate change. External determinants cover long-
term or permanent connections between country i and j, such as regional proximity (PROXij) 
or the common membership in an international and dynamically evolving relationships as they 
occur when two countries interact to coordinate and harmonize their national climate policies 
represented as network relations (NETijt). Equation 1 summarizes this relationship, where i 
and j refer to the individual country and t to time.  
ADOPTit = f (INTit = (Mit + Rit + ADOPTit-1) + EXTit = (PROXij +  NETijt))   Equation 1 
A crucial assumption of the network approach is that the existence and emergence of ties 
between the units of analysis depend on the existence of other ties (network dependence 
assumption) and exogenously given actor attributes (social selection assumption). Political 
events are ‘embedded within networks of interdependencies, the so-called ‘context’ of these 
phenomena’ (Leenders 2002, 21). This means that political actors are responsive to the 
context by contemplating the behavior of others. The occurrence of specific attributes or 
behavior therefore depends on these social ties as well as on the distribution of actor-specific 
characteristics and behavior across the network.  
Leenders (2002, p. 26) argues that social influence occurs ‘(…) when an actor adapts his 
behavior, attitude, or belief, to the behaviors, attitudes, or beliefs of other actors in the social 
system’. Whether the influence is intentional or not is irrelevant. The priority is the availability 
of information about the behavior and attitude of other actors to be able to mutually compare 
and learn. In our research context, this implies that countries have a higher probability of 
adopting a mitigation policy when they are interacting (e.g. to coordinate climate policies or 
harmonize policy approaches) with other countries that have already adopted climate policies. 
This argument is in line with findings from Bernstein, Cashore (2012) and Kern et al. (2001).  
The overall policy diffusion literature also widely accepts this claim (Gilardi 2010). Two main 
processes are at work here - communication and comparison. Communication ‘refers to social 
influence through direct contact between ego and alter’ (Leenders 2002, p. 27). 
Consequently, countries use other countries with which they have direct ties as their frame of 
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reference. For the diffusion of climate policies, this entails that countries are more likely to 
innovate their climate policy when they are directly interacting with other countries that have 
already adopted climate policies. These interactions may involve diplomatic communications, 
meetings of country officials, exchange of material and human resources, and so on. This leads 
to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Countries that interact with other countries that have already adopted 
climate policies should adopt more climate policies. 
Comparison with structurally equivalent or similar countries might trigger the adoption of 
new policies, too (Wejnert 2002). In the process of searching for a ‘social identity,’ a country 
ascribes to itself the same characteristics as structurally similar countries and adopts a similar 
behavior. Research on international conflict supports this claim by showing that countries 
tend to follow a similar behavior to structurally equivalent alters (Maoz et al. 2006). Abbot and 
DeViney (1992) in a study on the transnationality of the welfare state make a comparable 
claim. Countries are structurally equivalent either because they share important socio-
economic, demographic, political, or geographic characteristics or because they inhibit similar 
social positions in a political network. With respect to the network perspective, structural 
equivalence can be defined as the tendency to have and create ties with other actors that 
make similar choices. Thus, countries that interact with the same set of other countries hold 
a similar structural position and are said to be structurally equivalent. We call this interaction 
similarity. For the diffusion of climate policies, we expect countries to imitate other countries 
that are akin to themselves. This is based on the fact that these countries face the same 
political context and incentives, which may lead to emulation of each other’s policy adoption 
behavior due to mutual learning and comparison. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: A country will more likely adopt a climate policy if structurally equivalent 
countries also adopt climate policies. 
This approach also has its limitations, as it is not possible to solve the ‘chicken and egg’ 
problem and disentangle comparison from communication. In principle, however, countries 
with direct ties could compare themselves with each other and countries with indirect ties 
could have overlooked the channels of communication. Also, one cannot truly know whether 
the similarity of two structurally equivalent countries arises from comparison and/or 
communication. The results of this study are not meant to offer an empirical solution to 
separate these two distinct but interconnected theoretical concepts. However, it points to the 
importance of interdependent decision-making in a more general sense. 
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Research Design and Data 
Many earlier approaches to study climate policy diffusion processes use neighboring or 
peer group effects to capture physical or cultural closeness (Dolšak 2009, 2013; Fankhauser 
et al. 2014). The assumption is that geographical proximity, trade relations, common 
membership in international organizations, etc. create direct and indirect links between 
countries that result in social influence. This increases the likelihood of exhibiting similar policy 
adoption behavior. These applications frequently use an event history analysis (EHA) model. 
In an EHA, the main dependent variable is the risk of adopting a new policy. The unit of analysis 
is typically state-years, country-years, city-years, and so on. The problem with this approach 
is that although EHA models include neighboring effects, they are incapable of appropriately 
capturing the interdependencies between countries. Analogous to all kinds of linear 
regression models, in EHA models the observations are by assumption independent from each 
other. Therefore, arguing that policy adoption is a matter of interdependencies between the 
countries violates this very assumption.  
Gilardi and Füglister (2008) react to this problem by proposing a dyadic approach, in which 
the dependent variable is coded as 1 when country A makes its policy more similar to country 
B. According to them, ‘the dependent variable does not record policy change or the influence 
of one state over another but simply indicates an increased similarity in the policies of two 
states’ (Gilardi, Füglister 2008, p. 419). While we acknowledge that this approach is appealing, 
it is not without certain drawbacks. To begin with, the dependent variable cannot be observed 
directly and needs to be constructed indirectly. This makes the process of data collection 
cumbersome and particularly so with geographically large data sets. Secondly, this approach 
still neglects dependence structures of higher order as imposed by the network context, as 
dyadic models still assume independency between the dyads (Beck et al. 2006).  
Spatial models, in contrast, ‘provide ways to test and accommodate various forms of 
dependence between the observations’ (Beck et al. 2006, p. 28). The researcher knows the 
nature of the dependence structure and thus does not estimate it. It is usually given by what 
is called the connectivity matrix, usually denoted by W (Neumayer, Plümper 2016), where a 
typical element wij has a value of greater than 0 if the observations i and j are connected 
(diagonals are set to 0). In spatial models, the error term ei – best thought of as an omitted or 
unmeasured variables bias – in the current unit is correlated to the error of other units. Spatial 
autoregressive models go one step further. The idea is that the dependent variable (here, 
policy adoption) is affected by the value of the dependent variable in a connected unit. The 
closer the connection, the greater the effect. Therefore, interpreting the effects of 
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independent variables is more difficult than in linear regression models, as the effect involves 
feedback loops. For example, the effect of vulnerability has an impact on policy adoption in 
the current country, which then feeds through policy adoption in all other countries (through 
the connectivity lag) and these feed back to the current country until an equilibrium is 
reached. Hence, the effects get smaller and smaller with every subsequent round. Temporal-
spatial models are an extension in that they allow all variables (dependent, independent) and 
the connectivity matrix to vary over time and include time-lags (Franzese, Hays 2007). 
Network autocorrelation models use network relations as the connectivity matrix. In contrast 
to regional proximity, network relations can emerge or dissolve over time. Here, the 
weaknesses of the geographical approach are overcome. A network operationalization of 
country relations provides a much more precise reflection of structural interdependencies as 
they evolve dynamically over time.  
For this analysis, we apply a temporal network autocorrelation model that helps us to 
understand the structure and effect of political interactions on climate policy adoption. Our 
temporal network autocorrelation model has the general form as presented in Equation 24: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝜌𝜌1𝑉𝑉𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌2𝑊𝑊𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    Equation 2 
In this model, yit is our dependent variable (ADOPTit) – the adoption of mitigation policies 
for every country in the dataset at time t 5 – where yit is a count variable defined as the number 
of climate-related policies a country has adopted at time t. The first model term captures the 
set of covariates representing internal characteristics affecting the policy adoption behavior 
(INTit = (Mit + Rit + ADOPTit-1)), where 𝑋𝑋  is a vector of covariates and 𝑋𝑋  the respective 
parameter estimates. The second model term reflects attribute similarity. It is constructed by 
multiplying the similarity matrix 𝑉𝑉 based on a specific country attribute with the outcome 
variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . The intuition behind this model term is that country i’s behavior may be 
influenced by country j’s behavior if country i and j are similar with respect to this attribute. 
For example, if country i and j are from the same region they are expected to also show a 
similar policy adoption behavior. This model terms allows the inclusion of external 
determinants, like the geographical proximity of two countries (PROXt). The third model term 
hinges on the specification of the network connectivity matrix W at time t (i.e. the network of 
political, cooperative interactions at time t) multiplied with the dependent variable yit. This 
term represents the policy adoption behavior of other actors in the network at time t, (NETit). 
                                                 
4 Compare Leenders (2002) for an encompassing presentation of network autocorrelation models.  
5 Compare Equation 1: ADOPTit = f (INTit = (Mit + Rit + ADOPTit-1) + EXTit = (PROXi + NETit)) 
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In our model, the specification includes the effect of direct interactions between two countries 
and the interactions of structural equivalent countries.  
Climate policy data (ADOPTit) 
We base our analysis on the data from the Global Climate Legislation Study of 2015 
(Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics 2016). It captures climate change 
legislations targeting mitigation and adaptation in 99 countries plus the EU. These countries 
are collectively responsible for 93% of the world’s emissions. At present, 58 countries in the 
world have passed framework legislations, which address ‘multiple aspects or areas of climate 
change mitigation or adaptation (or both) in a holistic, overarching manner’ (Nachmany et al. 
2014, p. 15).6 On the other hand, sectoral climate policies only target one sector at a time, like 
for a law targeting the reduction of GHG emissions. These polices address different emission- 
intensive sectors, for example, emissions from agriculture, electricity and heat production, 
industry, or transport, and other climate-relevant sectors such as forestry or buildings. 
One problematic aspect in this analysis might be that we do not differentiate between 
framework legislations that address more than one sector at a time, and policies that are 
sector-specific. This might lead to an underestimation of the effect of policy diffusion, as some 
countries have actually adopted several policies in one go. In addition, the policies captured 
in the Global Climate Study are also quite heterogeneous in terms of the sectors they target. 
Treating them all as similar might obfuscate different policy diffusion mechanisms being at 
work at different sectors. Despite this heterogeneity, for all these policies, the main purpose 
is climate change mitigation. Of course, in different countries, different sectors contribute in 
different ways to the climate problem and, therefore, adopt different kinds of policies. Yet, 
their main aim is to reduce GHG emissions, which makes them homogenous in terms of their 
overall objective but different in their specific design. In addition, in our data set only a handful 
of countries have just sectoral policies. We, therefore, expect that the underlying 
heterogeneity will not have a significant impact on our analysis.  
A mitigation policy consists of measures to deal with lowering GHG emissions from sectors 
presented in Figure 1 and is either framework or sectoral legislations. To give an idea about 
the different kinds of mitigation policies, we provide examples of such mitigation legislations 
                                                 
6 An example of such a flagship or framework law will be Bulgaria’s Climate Change Mitigation Act. The 
act puts forward the principles of state policy for climate change, the rules relating to emissions trading 
and the modalities for financing green projects Nachmany et al. 2014. 
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from the world’s top three emitters. At present, these are China, the EU, and the United 
States. 
Table 1: Examples of mitigation policies from the World’s top three emitters 
COUNTRY YEAR OF 
LEGISLATION 
DESCRIPTION SECTORS TARGETED DESCRIPTION 
CHINA 2014 Energy Development 
Strategy Action Plan 
(2014-2020) 
Energy Supply, Energy 
Demand 
This strategy plan 
puts forward 
energy 
conservation as a 
priority in the 
power, industrial, 
building, and 
transport sectors 
US 2005 Energy Policy Act Energy Supply, Energy 
Demand, Transportation, 
Research and 
Development 
The Energy Policy 
Act (EPA) 
addresses energy 
production in the 
United States 
EU 28 2009 Clean and energy-
efficient road 
transport vehicles 
(Directive 
2009/33/EC on the 
promotion of clean 
and energy-efficient 
road transport 
vehicles) 
Transport This legislation 
promotes the use 
of clean and 
energy-efficient 
road transport 
vehicles 
Source: Adapted from Nachmany et al. 2014 
For the construction of our dependent variable, we coded mitigation policies as 1 and 
summed over the different periods. For example, in phase t1 if country X adopted two 
mitigation policies, the policy adoption variable has been coded as 2 for that time period and 
the same process is repeated for the other time periods as well. Compare Appendix A for the 
coding of climate policy adoption data and a list of countries. 
Operationalizing connectivity through interaction  
In the following, we show how we operationalized interaction and interaction similarity 
as network connectivity and how we collected the respective network data. For this purpose, 
we present the POLCLIMATE data set and we introduce two network autocorrelation terms 
(NETit) that are supposed to measure our two key concepts. The first, interaction, captures 
14 
the direct ties between two countries, i.e. when they are engaged in diplomatic or political 
events. The second, interaction similarity, measures to what extent two countries are 
engaged in similar diplomatic or political events. 
POLCLIMATE data set on interaction network data 
To collect information on country interactions, we have used the POLCLIMATE (Politics on 
Climate Change) event data set (cp. for more details Author(s), 2016, Hirschi 2008). The 
original data set is a sequence of daily dyadic political events related to climate change 
mitigation that occurred between 1995 and 2015. It includes both conflictive and cooperative 
events between 215 countries and international organizations. For this study, we used a 
subset of the POLCLIMATE data set that uses cooperative events only and equals the same 
countries including the EU that are available in the Global Legislation Study (2015). The final 
subset contains 98 countries including the EU. These countries cover more than 90% of the 
political interactions contained in the POLCLIMATE data set.  
We focus on cooperative interactions for several reasons. Countries often meet and 
exchange views and opinions in international negotiation forums. More often than not, they 
have opposing views but for mutual profitability reasons, they try to cooperate and find a 
common ground. This can be a precursor to political coordination between countries 
(Keohane 1984). We argue that these cooperative interactions are a good proxy for 
international interdependencies in climate politics as they can influence a country’s decisions 
and vary over time. It reflects a completely different aspect of interdependencies in 
comparison to spatial proximity or other structural similarities. Cooperation between 
countries can range from something trivial to something significantly important. For example, 
minor cooperation is when a country makes a critical or appraising comment on another 
country’s reformed policies. Substantial cooperation, on the other hand, is when a country 
offers to provide financial support or to agree to exchange confidential information. For exact 
definitions of the types of cooperative and conflictive events, consult Appendix B. 
Each cooperative, dyadic event can be understood as a tie in a network of political 
interactions. A convenient way to display these network relations is to transform the sequence 
of dyadic, cooperative events into a connectivity matrix that displays the number of all 
cooperative interactions between any pair of countries. More cooperative interactions imply 
closer connectivity between two countries. However, collapsing the complete event sequence 
into a single matrix would result in a significant loss of information. This would occur in 
particular with regard to possible dependencies between interactions over time. One possible 
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option to overcome this problem is to aggregate the dyadic event sequence into time slices. 
The resulting connectivity matrices display the number of interactions between any pair of 
countries in the respective phase.  
We had to take an important decision with respect to the number and scope of these 
phases. While a very small number of phases results in a problematic loss of information, an 
exceedingly large number of phases leads to a zero inflation of the connectivity matrices as 
not all countries are involved in political events every year. This potentially leads to an 
underestimation of the effect of political interactions on the adoption of climate policies. To 
overcome the trade-off between precision and parsimony, we decided to aggregate the 
dyadic data by four empirically meaningful time phases.  
Table 2 presents the phases (consult Appendix C for a detailed description of the periods). 
The table shows that the phases differ considerably with respect to the number of years they 
encompass. In this way, the phases reflect the fluctuation in the international awareness to 
the climate topic. For example, the two brief periods between 2005 and 2007 and 2008 and 
2009 have higher numbers of interactions than the other two phases. The international 
activity and awareness was peaking when countries were negotiating a potential Post Kyoto 
commitment in the aftermath to the successful Bali summit in 2007. The cooperative ties of 
each period are summarized in four weighted, connectivity (network) matrices. That is, the 
cells reflect the number of interactions, which two countries had in phase T. If a country did 
not interact in a period or was not mentioned in the news wire services, it was added to the 
matrix as a structural zero to ensure an equal number of actors across all periods. 
Table 2: Description of phases used in the analysis 
PHASE  NAME PERIOD NUMBER OF 
INTERACTIONS 
NUMBER OF 
ACTIVE 
COUNTRIES 
NUMBER OF 
PASSIVE 
COUNTRIES 
T1 Negotiating the Kyoto 
Protocol 
1995-
2004 
348 37 53 
T2 Implementing the Kyoto 
Protocol 
2005-07 358 37 53 
T3 Post Bali Enthusiasm 2008-09 594 40 50 
T4 Towards a New 
Agreement 
2010-15 290 39 15 
TOTAL   1590   
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Cooperative interaction 
The policy adoption behavior of directly interacting countries (cooperative interaction) is 
one of our two main explanatory factors. The related model term captures one form of 
network autocorrelation (Leifeld & Cranmer, 2016). The intuition behind these variables is 
that the policy adoption behavior of country i affects the adoption behavior of country j, 
because they interact. If the value of the autocorrelation variable is significant and positive, 
countries tend to show similar adoption behavior as compared to the countries with which 
they frequently interact. We construct the variables by multiplying the weighted network 
matrices, one matrix for each phase, with the policy adoption variable of the respective phase. 
The resulting vectors reflect for each country in each phase the level of policy adoption 
network autocorrelation. The values rise with the number of interactions and policies 
adopted. Consequently, the variable interprets the policy adoption behavior of other 
countries in a network perspective. We expect the model parameter to be significant and 
positive to support hypothesis 1. 
Interaction similarity 
To test hypothesis 2, we use a model term that encompasses the structural similarity of 
actors in terms of their cooperative interactions (interaction similarity). We consider actors 
that are similar in their social activity towards other actors to be structurally equivalent 
(Wasserman, Faust 1994, p. 348). We construct the interaction similarity model term as a 
similarity matrix based on Euclidian distance, which reflects the structural equivalence of two 
actors in terms of their cooperative ties. It is then multiplied by the policy adoption variable. 
We compute this for each of the four networks. Analogous to the interaction variables, the 
resulting vector reflects the extent to which a country shows similarity in its policy adoption 
behavior when compared to other structurally equivalent countries. We expect the model 
parameter to be significant and positive as evidence for hypothesis 2. 
Control variables 
Drawing from the existing literature, we operationalize internal (INTit) and external (EXTit) 
determinants of policy adoption. The first set of variables reflects the motivation (Mit) of a 
country to adopt mitigation policies. For this purpose, we account for vulnerability, the level 
of per capita CO2 emissions, population size, and the fossil fuel consumption as percentage of 
overall energy consumption. To measure vulnerability, we utilize the vulnerability component 
of the ND-GAIN Index since it is comprehensive, covers many countries and is adjusted for 
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GDP, reducing our chances of encountering multicollinearity.7 This variable covers the average 
vulnerability of country i and does not vary over time.8 We anticipate a negative correlation 
between high levels of vulnerability and the adoption of mitigation policies. Furthermore, we 
use per capita CO2 emissions (measured in tons per capita and logged) averaged for each 
period. We expect that countries with higher levels of CO2 emissions are more likely to 
introduce mitigation policies. In this vein, we also control for the population of a country, 
assuming that countries with a higher population emit more CO2. Moreover, for fossil fuels 
consumption we expect countries with a higher demand for fossil fuels to adopt more climate 
policies. Lastly, we control for political partisanship with the expectation that left-oriented 
governments will adopt more mitigation policies. The variable includes information on 
whether the ruling party of the chief executive is left, right, or center.9 
The next set of variables reflects the resources (Rit) available to a country and capacity of a 
country to adopt climate policies. Firstly, we control for GDP per capita (The World Bank 2017). 
We expect that countries with more financial resources will introduce more climate policies. 
This anticipation also comes from the fact that higher growth in GDP is usually associated with 
higher levels of GHG emissions. We use the Polity2 index to measure the level of democracy 
of a country (Teorell et al. 2018) and expect that the more democratic a country is the higher 
will be its rate of policy adoption.  
Moreover, existing mitigation policies (ADOPTit-1) might be positively correlated with 
whether a country adopts more mitigation policies. For instance, the existence of flagship laws 
may encourage countries to adopt more climate change mitigation. An additional motivation 
provided by existing policies may be due to the fact that countries realize the co-benefits 
accruing from adopting climate change mitigation policies in the past make them more likely 
to adopt climate change mitigation policies in the present.  
Lastly, we also control for external determinants (EXTit). The regional proximity (PROXi) of 
countries captures neighboring effects. For this purpose, we coded a variable that assigns 
countries to world regions as defined by the World Bank. In our model, we included the region 
                                                 
7  Compare: Notre Dame's Environmental Change Initiative (ND-ECI) (2015). Notre Dame Global 
Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) Available online: URL: http://index.gain.org/ranking/vulnerability.  
The vulnerability component measures the extent to which a country is susceptible to the adverse 
effects of climate change. Specifically, it captures a country’s exposure to climate hazards, its sensitivity 
to climate impacts, and its adaptive capacity. 
8 Compare Appendix D where we control for time varying vulnerability indicators. The results do not 
change. 
9 Data on CO2 emissions, fossil fuel consumption, and party governments are taken from the Quality of 
Government Standard Dataset 2018 (Teorell et al. 2018). 
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as a homophily term same region. A significant positive parameter estimate related to this 
variable would indicate that countries from the same region show similar policy adoption 
behavior. Table 3 summarizes all variables and their function in the research design.  
Table 1: Overview of all variables, their role in the research design, and data source 
MODEL TERMS VARIABLE 
NAME 
EXPLANATION DATA SOURCE RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Policy adoption 
(ADOPTit) 
Number of adopted 
climate change mitigation 
policies in period t 
Global Climate 
Legislation Study 
Dependent 
variable 
INTERNAL DETERMINANTS 
EXISTING 
POLICIES 
(ADOPTIT-1) 
Own past policy 
adoption 
behaviour  
Number of adopted 
climate change mitigation 
policies in period t-1 
Global Climate 
Legislation Study 
Control 
variable 
MOTIVATION 
(MIT) 
Vulnerability Average vulnerability of 
country i towards climate 
change risk (averaged 
across periods) 
ND-GAIN Index 
of vulnerability 
Control 
variable 
 CO2 emissions 
pc (log) 
Average per capita CO2 
emissions (tons, logged) in 
period t 
(average of period) 
Quality of 
Governance 
dataset 2018 
Control 
variable 
 Population  Average population 
(logged) in period t 
Quality of 
Governance 
dataset 2018 
Control 
variable 
 Fossil fuel 
consumption 
Average fuel consumption 
(% overall energy 
consumption) in period t 
Quality of 
Governance 
dataset 2018 
Control 
variable 
 Left 
Government 
Ruling party is left in period 
t 
Quality of 
Governance 
dataset 2018 
Control 
variable 
RESOURCES 
(RIT) 
Democracy 
level (Polity2) 
Average level of democracy 
in period t 
Quality of 
Governance 
dataset 2018 
Control 
variable 
 GDP per capita  Average GDP per capita 
PPP in period t 
Quality of 
Governance 
dataset 2018 
Control 
variable 
EXTERNAL DETERMINATS 
 Cooperative 
interactions 
Adoption behaviour of 
directly linked countries 
Global Climate 
Legislation Study 
& 
POLCLIMATE 
data set 
H1 
 Interaction 
similarity 
Adoption behaviour of 
structurally equivalent 
actors 
Global Climate 
Legislation Study 
& 
POLCLIMATE 
data set 
H2 
 Same region Regional proximity 
captured as homophily 
variable, i.e. whether 
country i and j are located 
in the same world region. 
Own coding 
according to 
World Bank 
regions 
Control 
variable 
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Results  
We estimated the model in R using the ‘tnam’ package (Leifeld and Cranmer (2016) and 
the ‘lmer’ package (Bates et al. 2015). As our dependent variable is a count variable with the 
mean differing from the variance, we executed the temporal network autocorrelation model 
using a negative binomial distribution function. We include fixed effects to control for 
unobservable period-specific events that could affect our results. 
We estimated the parameters with maximum-likelihood estimation, which is the standard 
estimation routine implemented in the ‘lmer’ package. We also scaled and centered all the 
variables used in the analysis to improve model convergence. Doing this also enhanced 
interpretability of the results. Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of our models with 
standard errors in parentheses. The results are presented as the direct coefficients. We 
started the analysis with a model that includes only internal determinants in Model 1. Model 
2 is the classical version of the integrated diffusion model, including geographical proximity 
indicated by the same region homophily term. In Model 3, we take in the two network 
autocorrelation terms that capture the effect of political interactions on climate policy 
adoption alongside regional proximity. However, there is a high correlation between structural 
similarity and geographical proximity, which is why the effects are both not significant. This is 
hardly surprising as structurally similar countries are often located in the same region. In 
general, structural equivalence in this context contends that countries having similar 
background conditions will demonstrate a comparable political behavior. Therefore, we 
assume that countries that are structurally equivalent in terms of their cooperative 
interactions are also likely to share similar individual characteristics relevant to the climate 
change issue (e.g. vulnerability, wealth, per capita emissions, geographical location, etc.). 
Therefore, in Model 4, we present a version of the integrated model with the two network 
autocorrelation terms but without the Same Region variable. The advantage of using political 
interactions to study diffusion is that they vary over time. This offers a much more precise 
estimation of country interdependencies than the time-invariant geographical proximity 
variable 10 . Furthermore, we present marginal effects for the significant model terms in 
Appendix E. 
                                                 
10 In addition to these models, in Appendix D, we present a number of robustness checks. We estimated 
a number of models testing other covariates, variable combinations, interaction effects, and models 
using different time slices. Overall, our results are robust across these models. 
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Table 4: Results Temporal Network Autocorrelation Model 
 MODEL 1 
(ADOPTIT) 
MODEL 2 
(ADOPTIT) 
MODEL 3 
(ADOPTIT) 
MODEL 4 
(ADOPTIT) 
INTERCEPT   0.37 
 (0.34)              
  0.29 ***  
 (0.07)           
 0.29 ***  
(0.07)            
 0.30 *** 
(0.07)        
INTERNAL DETERMINANTS (INTIT) 
 
MOTIVATION (MIT) 
 
FOSSIL FUEL CONSUMPTION   0.12  
 (0.08)         
  0.11  
 (0.08)         
 0.12    
(0.08)       
 0.13  
(0.08)    
CO2 PER CAPITA -0.21 *  
(0.09)      
-0.22 *   
(0.09)     
-0.21 *   
(0.09)     
-0.18  * 
(0.09)        
POPULATION (LOGGED)  0.40 ***  
(0.70)     
 0.40 ***  
(0.07)     
 0.39 ***  
(0.07)     
 0.40 *** 
(0.07) 
LEFT GOVERNMENT  0.08  
(0.06)         
 0.07    
(0.06)       
 0.06  
(0.06)         
 0.09  
(0.06)    
VULNERABILITY  0.00   
(0.11)        
-0.02 
(0.11)                 
 0.00   
(0.11)              
 0.00   
(0.11)              
RESOURCES (RIT) 
 
GDP PER CAPITA (LOGGED)   0.20 
 (0.14)                 
  0.22   
 (0.14)               
 0.22  
(0.14)                
 0.20    
(0.14)         
DEMOCRACY STATUS (POLITY2)   0.26 ***    
 (0.07)          
  0.26 ***   
 (0.07)           
 0.26 ***    
(0.07)          
 0.28 *** 
(0.07)        
EXISTING POLICIES (ADOPTIT-1) 
 
PAST POLICY ADOPTION  0.00   
(0.05)               
 0.00   
(0.05)               
 0.01  
(0.05)               
-0.01    
(0.05)            
EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS 
 
SAME REGION (PROXI)   0.53 *** 
(0.05)                    
 0.52 **   
(0.18)             
   
NETWORK AUTOCORRELATION 
 
INTERACTION SIMILARITY   -0.02    
(0.18)        
 0.47 *** 
(0.05)         
COOPERATIVE INTERACTION    0.05   
(0.05)               
  0.11 *   
 (0.04) 
AIC 912.18 904.11 906.83 912.57 
BIC 951.76 947.29 957.21 959.35 
LOG LIKELIHOOD -445.09 -440.05 -439.41 -443.29 
NUM. OBS. 270 270 270 270 
NUM. GROUPS 3 3 3 3 
TIME FIXED EFFECTS yes yes yes yes 
NOTES (P < 0.001 ***, P < 0.01 **, P < 0.05 *) 
STANDARD ERROR IN PARENTHESES 
Comparing across the models shows, as suggested in our first hypothesis, that cooperative 
interactions in the form of an exchange of resources, personal interactions, and knowledge 
transfer increases the likelihood for adopting climate policies. Repeated cooperation fosters 
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trust and triggers mutual learning, which reduces the likelihood of a free-riding behavior and 
increases the propensity for coordinated action in the context of climate change mitigation. 
Hypothesis 2 states that actors that are structurally equivalent, i.e. they show a similar 
interaction behavior, to countries that adopt a high number of climate policies, are 
significantly more likely to adopt climate policies. Being similarly embedded in the 
international context, therefore, seems to cause comparable incentives for adopting climate 
policies, thereby leading to similar policy adoption behavior. On the one hand, these countries 
possibly compare with each other triggering policy learning. On the other hand, other 
countries set benchmarks for their own behavior in a positive as well as a negative sense. In 
the case of climate policy, countries fear competitive disadvantages from adopting national 
policies. This may cause them not to surpass others in their engagement of the mitigation of 
climate change. Conversely, if others are particularly active with regard to climate change 
mitigation, social pressure might increase the need to adopt more policies. Overall, these 
results provide evidence for both of our hypotheses. 
With respect to our control variables, the results show that countries with higher GDP per 
capita do not adopt more mitigation policies. One possible explanation is that in many rich 
countries, climate-related laws are already in place rendering the need for further legislation 
unnecessary. Results of the Global Climate Legislation study (Nachmany et al. 2014) supports 
this consideration and show that the most recent growth of climate policies has 
predominantly taken place in the developing world. For the Polity2 model term, we find a 
positive effect for the parameter estimate, which is highly consistent with the earlier literature 
on the effect of democracy on climate policy (Bättig, Bernauer 2009; Bernauer 2013). 
Furthermore, there is no significant effect of the level of fossil fuel consumption. But, the effect 
is robust and consistent across all models. Moreover, we find that the population parameter 
is positively significant and robust across all the models, implying that ceteris paribus, more 
populated countries adopt more policies. These countries are usually also those with the 
highest absolute values of CO2 emissions. Both aspects, the level of fossil fuel consumption 
and emissions, trigger national policies to prevent pollution or decrease the dependency on 
fossil resources. Co-benefits that arise from these policies such as the reduction of local air 
pollution, increased energy efficiency, and so on are an additional explanation. Moreover, big 
polluters are under immense international pressure to act and adopt effective climate 
legislation. In contrast, the results also show that countries with high per capita CO2 emissions 
adopt fewer policies than those countries with lower per capita emissions. We argue that 
countries with high levels per capita emissions, like the oil-exporting countries of the Middle 
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East, have far less incentives to reduce their emissions as their economies strongly depend on 
fossil energy sources. Moreover, as expected we do not find significant effects for the 
vulnerability of a country. We also do not find any effect of political partisanship of a country. 
Also, the model shows no effect related to the number of climate policies adopted in the past. 
Finally, for the same region variable, we find a positive and significant effect, which confirms 
the findings of many earlier diffusion studies claiming that policies diffuse across 
geographically close countries.  
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Concluding Comments 
In this article, we demonstrate how international interactions can influence national 
mitigation policy adoption. Aligning with other contributions (e.g. Mohrenberg 2017), our 
research highlights the added value of integrating a dynamic social network perspective in the 
climate policy diffusion literature. Our analysis establishes that accounting for temporal 
network dependencies enriches analytical frameworks such as the ‘unified model of 
government innovation’ (Berry, Berry 2014) in their explanatory power. Political interactions 
between countries from bi- or multilateral political events reflect international relations in a 
more overarching way than the traditional approaches of the diffusion literature, which rely 
on spatial approaches to operationalize interdependencies. This is of in particular relevance 
for global issue areas, such as climate change policy. 
In this context, we proposed a dynamic network analysis of political interactions between 
country pairs, using a subset of 98 countries and the European Union to reveal general 
patterns connected to the adoption and diffusion of national mitigation policies in the past 
two decades. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach that uses political 
interactions as a proxy for interdependencies in the climate policy realm. The most crucial 
advantage of this approach is that it accounts for changing political circumstances, by 
operationalizing these changing international relations. Internal determinants, like the 
motivation and resources of a country to tackle climate change, are undoubtedly significant 
aspects of climate policy adoption. Different countries may be incentivized in differing degrees 
to implement climate protection measures, on account of specific national circumstances. 
Examples of national characteristics affecting the likelihood of adopting climate policies may 
be the prevailing energy mix of a country, its vulnerability towards climate change, or the 
strength of environmental organizations. However, these internal factors, as long as they do 
not vary over time, are not sufficient to explain the changes in the policy adoption behavior 
of a country. In addition, the diffusion of policies characterizes a relational process. To gather 
an accurate understanding of diffusion, a time as well as network perspective is indispensable. 
Our results underline this argument, as they clearly show that the propensity of a country to 
adopt climate change mitigation policies rises if it repeatedly engages in cooperative 
interactions with, or is structurally equivalent to, a country that has implemented comparable 
policies.  
This research has vital implications for the climate change literature more specifically. In 
line with Jordan et al. (2015), it highlights the importance of a polycentric perspective on the 
‘small but positive steps’ (Ostrom 2012, p. 353) that are underway at the national and local 
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scale to combat climate change. Countries cooperate if they disagree over important 
contestations to align their positions in the international climate negotiations and to 
coordinate national climate protection measures. As a result, countries are more likely to 
adopt similar policies at the national level if they are increasingly cooperating with each other. 
If governments regularly exchange information about their programs, negotiate activities, or 
settle disputes, they develop reliable relationships. In turn, these relationships exert influence 
on each other through a process of communication and comparison. Even in the absence of 
these close relationships, national governments must consider the policy positions and 
activities of other countries. In a policy domain, prone to free-riding, ambitious solo runs can 
be costly due to relative losses and competitive disadvantages. Contrariwise, ambitious 
initiatives from other actors, especially if they are in similar structural positions, may increase 
the social pressure to emulate social norms. This creates an incentive to implement policies. 
In addition, the paper demonstrates that countries implement more national climate 
policies if they cooperate with other countries that also adopt climate protection measures. If 
a country learns that other countries comply with the international climate protection regime, 
they are more likely to comply themselves. Repeated and reciprocated interaction between 
countries reduces free-riding behavior, due to the increased social control in the absence of 
powerful sanction mechanisms. Also, the international process creates awareness of the 
climate problem among governments and the general public. It is, therefore, increasingly 
difficult to diminish. In this process of continuous interaction, countries also compare with 
each other to understand what they do in terms of climate policy, especially when they share 
similar backgrounds. Moreover, direct interactions create a channel for communication and 
policy learning. The international climate regime facilitates all these processes by creating a 
common forum for regular meetings and negotiations, dealing with disputes, exchanging 
information, and so on. Therefore, even if climate negotiations fail to deliver effective 
agreements, they create a forum that fosters cooperation among countries and increases the 
likelihood for the adoption of climate policies.  
However, we do acknowledge our study has some drawbacks related to the data used. To 
begin with, the data on climate change related mitigation legislation from the Global Climate 
Legislation Study did not include sub-national laws or amendments to the current laws and 
this could have led to a valuable loss of observations. Moreover, the analysis might have 
profited from a qualitative differentiation between different climate mitigation policies, such 
as framework legislation vs. sectoral policies, different sectors, or even policy design-related 
aspects. This might have helped us understand more about what kind of policies or policy 
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instruments are more likely to diffuse. For future research, we suggest extending our 
approach by differentiating policies with respect to their outreach (e.g. sector-specific vs. 
flagship laws). A more nuance integration of policies possibly improves the model of the 
diffusion processes, by avoiding an underestimation of comprehensive legislation. 
Alternatively, a further area of research could be directed towards a more policy design-
oriented perspective that studies the mechanisms behind the diffusion of sectoral-specific 
legislation or policy instruments.  
Additionally, the use of event data is not without complications. The most common threats 
to validity (Schrodt, Gerner 1994; Hirschi 2009) in event data coding are biases introduced by 
the choice of media sources. Furthermore, coding scheme or coding process may also lead to 
biases. The source-related validity issues mostly arise in the course of the editorial selection 
process. For example, it may arise when conflictive events dominate the reporting (conflict 
orientation), or when media attention towards a specific issue decreases (media fatigue), or 
due to the duplicate stories that emerge when multiple reports on the same event are 
published by numerous media sources or repeated in different reports. We tried reducing 
these validity issues by using the electronic wire services Agence France Presse, as editorial 
choices affect them less than other journalistic sources like newspapers (Schrodt 2012). An 
integration of other wire services from other countries might improve the validity of the 
dataset by increasing the number observations. Finally, we restrict the present study to 
cooperative interactions only and do not distinguish between different intensities of 
cooperation. Therefore, a possible follow-up project could work towards refining the policy 
networks and testing for various types of interaction that may also include conflictive events. 
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